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Articulating a Zen Buddhist perspective on humor, this paper examines the Japanese Zen 
Buddhist response of humor in the face of the suffering of situated existence and the 
motivations for this response. The examination will take the school of Rinzai Zen 
Buddhism as its exemplar. I argue that in order to appreciate the function of humor in Zen 
a number of cultural and historical influences must be considered: correlative ontology; the 
Buddhist notion of emptiness; the impotence of language; sense and nonsense; and the 
senselessness of transgression. 
 
The following paper aims to examine the Japanese Zen Buddhist response of humor in the 
face of the suffering of situated existence and the motivations for this response. The 
examination will take the school of Rinzai Zen Buddhism as its exemplar. It is an essay of 
five parts. In order to appreciate the function of humor in Zen a number of cultural and 
historical influences must be considered: correlative ontology; the Buddhist notion of 
emptiness; the impotence of language; sense and nonsense; and the senselessness of 
transgression.  
 A few provisos before beginning: the trajectory of the argument presented here 
entertains and delimits connections between the humorous and the senseless on the grounds 
of the limits of meaning found in selected literature from the history of Zen Buddhism. It 
is my intention to present a framework through which the perpetuation of suffering that 
lies at the heart of the Buddhist tradition can be re-imagined and re-engaged lightly, loftily, 
and humorously. Through an appreciation of the conceptual undermining of Buddhist 
emptiness, it is possible to counterbalance the seriousness of situated existence with humor. 
It is possible to laugh in the face of it all. It is also important that I concede at the outset 
how utterly non-humorous the following treatment of humor is. I agree with Hans-Georg 
Moeller’s observation of the unfortunate fact that “to philosophize about laughter is usually 
quite unfunny” (2010, p. 9).  
 It is first worth offering gratitude to those who have impressively engaged the 
traditions of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism and teased out a number of the functions and 
specific instances of humor in the canon. It is especially worth mentioning the work of 
Conrad Hyers, who in many ways served as a trailblazer for this line of enquiry. His belief 
that the comic spirit of Zen arises out of the abrupt collision of Indian spiritualism and the 
earthiness of the Chinese remains a powerful and persuasive one (Hyers, 1974, p. 24). As 
Buddhism finds its way from India into China, it is conspicuous how quickly the very strict 
regulations concerning bodily displays of good humor are laid by the wayside in order to 
better articulate the Chinese worldview. Hotei, the laughing heavy-set incarnation of 
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Maitreya Buddha, serves as a case in point. This trend is promoted and consequently 
accelerates as Zen Buddhism moves from China into Japan. 
 It is in the early schools of Zen Buddhism that we first come to encounter true Buddhist 
clowns. These clowns are not to be confused with lowbrow, base, and boorish buffoons. 
They are not instances of “the clown as some inferior species, approaching the infantile or 
subhuman or chaotic,” but instances of “the clown who in all his lowliness and simplicity 
and childlikeness, as well as in his iconoclasm and redemptive profanity, is truly great, 
truly profound, truly free” (Hyers, 1974, p. 30). The celebration of the lowly, the simple, 
and the childlike serve to reinforce Hyers’ belief that the earthiness of “Oriental 
Humanism,” and the influences of Daoism in particular, give way to the comic spirit of 
Zen, thereby elevating the playful and the humorous to the great, the profound, and the 
free. Zen’s self-descriptions are such that they promote themselves as playfully serious, 
and as seriously playful. The doctrine beyond words and letters becomes something of a 
Marx Brothers production, showing what can’t be said, and insisting that one forget the 
finger and look to the moon with a quick poke in the eye. Hyers describes Zen less crassly:  
 
[Zen] is like a man up a tree who hangs on a branch by his teeth with his hands and feet in 
the air. A man at the foot of the tree asks him, “What is the point of Bodhidharma’s coming 
from the West?” If he does not answer he would seem to evade the question. If he answers 
he would fall to his death. (1974, p. 32)  
 
 This remains the precarious position of Zen Buddhism, perhaps the only spiritual 
school that advises one to kill its namesake, that depicts conflict resolution as tearing a cat 
in half, and that celebrates the tremendous insight displayed by placing a sandal on one’s 
head.  
 The seriousness and appropriateness of such disarming humor can only be ascertained 
with a correct understanding of the correlative ontology espoused by Zen Buddhism and 
the subsequent anti-essentialist connotations of the Buddhist theory of emptiness as it is 
taken up in China and Japan.  
 
Correlative Ontology: Funny Is As Funny Does 
 
Zen humor is serious. It is as serious as Hegel or Kant. According to Moeller, “In Zen 
Buddhism the outburst of laughter as such is physically, emotionally, and socially applied 
philosophy. It is not an exaggeration to say that in Zen Buddhism laughter can be deemed 
a more appropriate philosophical practice than, for instance, writing or lecturing—or even 
thinking” (2010, p. 9). The embodied nature of social relations facilitates an affective 
transmission, which instructs and edifies in ways that language is unable to accomplish on 
its own. This remains equally true of texts that describe such relations. One need only 
consider the story of the dying Zen master as evidence in support of this claim:  
 
A Zen master lay dying. His monks had all gathered around his bed, from the most senior 
to the most novice monk. The senior monk leaned over to ask the dying master if he had 
any final words of advice for his monks. The old master slowly opened his eyes and in a 
weak voice whispered, “Tell them Truth is like a river.” The senior monk passed on this 
bit of wisdom in turn to the monk next to him, and it circulated around the room from one 
monk to another. When the words reached the youngest monk he asked, “What does he 
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mean, ‘Truth is like a river?’” The question was passed back around the room to the senior 
monk who leaned over the bed and asked, “Master, what do you mean, ‘Truth is like a 
river?’” Slowly the master opened his eyes and in a weak voice whispered, “OK, truth is 
not like a river.” (Hyers, 1989, p. 271) 
 
 In order to make sense of this “joke,” we must first come to terms with the background 
of its punch line, and how the inclusion of the master-disciple relation facilitates the 
transmission of a rather complex philosophical idea. To begin with, regarding “river,” it is 
at once both like truth and not like truth. The punch line builds on what is perhaps one of 
the most famous Zen sayings, which is often ascribed to Qingyuan Weixin:  
 
Before a man studies Zen, to him mountains are mountains and waters are waters; after he 
gets an insight into the truth of Zen through the instruction of a good master, mountains to 
him are not mountains and waters are not waters; but after this when he really attains to the 
abode of rest, mountains are once more mountains and waters are waters. (Suzuki, 1949, 
p. 24)  
 
 These three stages of development within Zen are all drawn upon in the story, 
highlighting the existential predicament of the Zen practitioner who is always being thrown 
back into the world, back into their ill-fated (disastrous) situated existence. The Zen master 
initially communicates his having attained the abode of rest by likening truth to a river only 
to concede his ongoing education through the insight that truth is not like a river. This 
concession promotes his function as master insofar as it instructs his young disciples who 
remain convinced of the truth of rivers, and not the likeness of truth to the truth of the river. 
The story highlights the paradoxical interconnection of the truth of the river and the non-
truth of the river, and how both can be thought to be rightly ascribable to “river.” While 
the intellect is unable to resolve successfully such a logical tension, the initial recognition 
of its failings and shortcomings is shown as a necessary step in both calming the mind and 
seeking the truth elsewhere. In this way, the truth and non-truth of the river are like truth 
(which both is and is not true). Significantly, as Suzuki notes, “Zen carries its paradoxical 
assertions into every detail of our daily life” (1949, p. 273).  
 These paradoxes are grounded in the Zen Buddhist appropriation and use of the 
Mahayana Buddhist theory of the two-truths, which has a direct bearing on the Buddhist 
notion of emptiness. In order to appreciate the inclusion of paradox in Zen, one must 
appreciate the nature of this notion of emptiness, and in order to appreciate the Zen notion 
of emptiness, one must appreciate the correlative ontology that is assumed by the theory of 
the two-truths. Through these movements, articulations of paradox, sense, and non-sense 
settle into comic style. Comic style, in turn, is able to facilitate direct transmission. 
 The Mahayana Buddhist theory of the two-truths is constitutive of the distinction 
between conventional reality and ultimate reality (Garfield & Priest, 2003, p. 4), where 
conventional reality refers to the realm of non-essential phenomena and ultimate reality 
refers to the very non-essential nature of that realm. In Zen philosophy, owing in part to 
influences from the Tendai and Kegon schools of Buddhism, the distinction collapses on 
itself to the extent that both truths are expressions of one reality, despite being seemingly 
mutually exclusive. Each position is dispelled through its self-contradiction upon analysis, 
including the position of ultimate reality, lest it should be misunderstood as substantive 
and essentialistic. The form the theory of the two-truths takes in Rinzai Zen Buddhism can 
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therefore be understood as a development of the ideas of the second-century Madhyamaka 
philosopher Nāgārjuna (Whitehead, 2012). However, the Zen articulation of this theory 
leads to results drastically different from the work of Nāgārjuna, namely the affirmation of 
nothing as opposed to the negation of everything. This position is unique to Zen. The 
interplay of the conventional and the actual re-affirms the position of reality as comprised 
of convenient designations for phenomenal experience. However, as convenient 
designations, these same phenomena are without substance. They are empty. They lack an 
essence in the traditional philosophical sense. They are real only correlationally, and their 
being exists only in and through relations that are specific to them. No thing exists 
independently or from its own perspective. 
  
Emptiness: No-Thing is Funny 
 
Instead, all things exist only inter-dependently. This includes the name-form construct of 
“things” proper, as well as Being and Non-being, Real and Non-real. In other words, the 
phenomenal world is made up of phantom-like entities that effect and are affected by each 
other. As a simple visualization, one might imagine wind-currents interacting with each 
other and shaping each other, all the while only being perceived indirectly through their 
influence on objects like trees. These trees, in turn, are perceived in their tree-ness only 
through their interactions with elements, such as the wind, and simultaneously effect and 
are affected by the wind, interacting with it and shaping it in its interactions with other 
wind-currents. This visualization would expand into a matrix of relations that would 
ultimately leave nothing out of its web. There is nothing that stands alone; no-thing has an 
essence. This truth concerning reality extends to social relationships, somatic practices, and 
spirituality as well. It is primarily in the realm of social relationships that we find the humor 
of Zen Buddhism used for the sake of pedagogy. From Ōbaku’s striking of his students 
with a staff, to Rinzai’s striking of his students with a roar, to Ikkyū’s striking of his 
students with presuppositional judgments through the breakdown of moral dichotomies, 
Zen works to break down conventional reality with an immediate and sudden realization. 
This realization is to be facilitated through paradox, through nonsense, and through humor. 
 Relaying a story about Ikkyū, Heinrich Dumoulin writes, 
 
Once when he was begging, dressed in old clothes, he was given a half-penny at the door 
of a wealthy landlord. He later visited the same house dressed in the violet garb of his 
office. He was received in an inner room and offered a sumptuous meal. He then rose from 
the table, took off his robe, and placed it before the food, declaring that the festive meal 
belonged not to him but only to his robe. (Dumoulin, 2005, p. 196) 
 
 This story, in addition to being funny, is an excellent example of the correlative 
ontology at the heart of the theory of emptiness. The master-disciple relation overtakes the 
host-guest relation through a disruption of the phenomenal context. Ikkyū highlights the 
social illusion of status in offering the meal to his clothes. As a consequence of this 
correlative ontology, all things are understood as empty, in the sense that no thing has 
essence, or exists from its own point of view. Zen pedagogy is designed to achieve this 
disruption, to facilitate this sudden transmission, in a wide variety of ways. The records 
depict a regular use of shouting, of physical abuse, of the use of paradoxes such as are 
Andrew K. Whitehead 31 
 
found in koans, and oftentimes the use of nonsense. Rather than becoming upset at the 
situation, Ikkyū responds by ridiculing the underlying reality that gives way to the situation. 
Almost naked, Ikkyū makes us laugh at the social divide and its inherently empty nature.  
 While earlier schools of Buddhism, especially Indian Buddhism, consisted in rather 
serious logical or analytical exercises designed to gain insight into and thereby dissolve 
illusions, early forms of Zen added humor to the repertoire of tools with which to transmit 
truth. This aspect of Zen Buddhism has become its most popular and well-known feature. 
This development, however, is not without its own transgressions. 
 Indian Buddhist scholastics distinguished between six classes of laughter. Only the 
most restrained forms of laughter were considered appropriate for monks (Hyers, 1974, p. 
34). Hyers (1974) describes these six classes of laughter as follows: 
 
sita: a faint, almost imperceptible smile manifest in the subtleties of facial 
expression and countenance alone; 
hasita: a smile involving a slight movement of the lips, and barely revealing the 
tips of the teeth; 
vihasita: a broad smile accompanied by a modicum of laughter; 
upahasita: accentuated laughter, louder in volume, associated with movements of 
the head, shoulders, and arms;  
apahasita: loud laughter that brings tears; and 
atihasita: the most boisterous, uproarious laughter attended by movements of the 
entire body (e.g., doubling over in raucous guffawing, convulsions, hysterics, 
“rolling in the aisles,” etc.). 
 
 This type of hierarchy is completely foreign to Zen, and to Japanese Buddhism more 
generally. Apart from its inception with the faint smile of Makakasho, Zen Buddhism has 
by and large been depicted as taking part in the three baser forms of laughter, and often 
exclusively in the basest form of laughter. This shift is made possible in light of the focus 
on the somatic dimensions of practice in Zen. Buddhism is not “all in the head,” but must 
be practiced throughout one’s being in all walks, talks, and guffaws of life. This practice 
requires new modes and means of communicating the dharma, in light of the inadequacy 
of words and letters, of sutras and shastras; it requires a language that is self-reflexive and 
able to undermine its own constructs for the sake of pointing towards nothing. 
 
The Impotence of “Ordinary” Language 
 
As a result of the correlative ontology adopted by Zen Buddhism, ordinary language, as a 
collection of empty signifiers, is ultimately unable to express or correspond with anything. 
Language, like things, exists only correlationally. Linguistic definition is possible only in 
light of the interrelationality of language as a whole. Understood in this way, language is 
said to communicate only about itself. There are no absolute ties that bind particular words 
to particular phenomena; there are only conventional ties that arise in context. Language 
generates expectations for itself, which are satisfied or not by contextually situated persons 
in a given relation. Zen Buddhism makes use of these expectations. It not only fails to 
satisfy them, but also deliberately offends them in an attempt to collapse, even if only 
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momentarily, the entire structure. The outcome of these failures and offenses is often 
humor. The following story about Rinzai serves as a case and point: 
 
One day when the master and Puhua were attending a dinner at a patron’s house, the master 
asked, “A hair swallows up the great sea and a mustard seed contains Mount Sumeru. Is 
this the marvelous activity of supernatural power or is it original substance as it is?” Puhua 
kicked over the dinner table. “How coarse!” exclaimed the master. “What place do you 
think this is—talking about coarse and fine!” said Puhua. The next day the master and 
Puhua again attended a dinner. The master asked, “How does today’s feast compare with 
yesterday’s?” Puhua kicked over the dinner table as before. “Good enough,” said the 
master, “but how coarse!” “Blind man!” said Puhua. “What’s buddhadharma got to do with 
coarse and fine?” The master stuck out his tongue. (Sasaki, 2009, p. 35) 
 
 Through a series of seemingly different conversations, the two interlocutors “descend” 
from abstract intellectualist paradoxes into exclamatorily evocative dissatisfaction into 
communications beyond words and letters: into the somatic and the affective as a form of 
direct pointing. It is in this “base” mode of physicalism and zaniness that the koan is 
realized as an expression of the non-essential nature of the initial problem. The story’s 
humor is embellished through the setting, as the exchange takes place at a patron’s house, 
and yet the situation is itself drawn out as empty as Puhua exclaims, “What place do you 
think this is.” Interestingly, the humor of the story is made possible in light of the fact that 
the conversation seems to occur in a non-place: at once in a host-guest relation, a master-
disciple relation, and a master-master relation. The correlation is therefore depicted as 
many, before being undermined altogether in the culminating punch line of the sticking out 
of the tongue. If everything is non-dual, non-essential, and empty, then what could possibly 
be meant by “coarse?” More importantly, what does it convey in this story? If 
buddhadharma is non-dualistic, then there can be no “proper” practice by which to gain 
insight into the true reality of things. Any and all actions hold the potential for insight, 
including the vulgar or unconventional. In this way, too, the Zen Buddhist practice of 
humor in the face of suffering offers a unique method of “slapping” persons into a state of 
awareness. It offers a model for sudden realization through the building up of and failure 
to deliver on conventional expectations. The conventional truth of the situation is thereby 
drawn out and shown as it is: non-essential, empty, no-thing.  
 
Using Nonsense: Expect the Unexpected 
 
This practice makes use of the sense of nonsense. Operating outside of the traditional 
boundaries of sense, insofar as it is operating outside of the traditional boundaries of 
meaningful expectations, Zen Buddhist stories also prove constitutive of conventions in 
precisely the same fashion as humor. To “get” the joke is a similar realization as to “get” 
the meaning of the disruption of the situation. The Three Stooges are funny only insofar as 
they are not perceived as making light of chronic abuse and violence. Their slapstick 
unsettles relationships of cooperation and competition in the industrial and capitalist 
conventions of the time. In the same way, Puhua kicking over the table and Rinzai sticking 
out his tongue unsettles the relationships proper to their situation and even situatedness as 
such. In any given setting, expectations are made manifest in light of conventions 
appropriate to the situation, and it is precisely the intentional undermining of these 
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expectations that becomes the comic spirit of Zen Buddhist practices. Turning again to the 
records, a story about Ōbaku reinforces the shift from abstract intellectualism to the 
somatic and the non-linguistic as more suitable in its comic delivery of correct 
understanding. It reads: 
 
Our Master once attended an assembly at the Bureau of the Imperial Salt Commissioners 
at which the Emperor T’ai Chung was also present as a layman who had taken the ten 
precepts. The layman noticed our Master enter the hall of worship and make a triple 
prostration to the Buddha, whereupon he asked: “If we are to seek nothing from the 
Buddha, Dharma or Sangha, what does Your Reverence seek by such prostration?” 
“Though I seek not from the Buddha,” replied our Master, “or from the Dharma, or from 
the Sangha, it is my custom to show respect in this way.” “But what purpose does it serve?” 
insisted the layman, whereupon he suddenly received a slap. “Oh,” he exclaimed, “How 
uncouth you are!” “What is this?” cried the Master. “Imagine making a distinction between 
refined and uncouth!” So saying, he administered another slap. (Blofeld, 1994, p. 95)  
 
These slaps, according to their own conventions, are showings of respect. They are 
practices with which to “wake-up” the layman from his expectations, even when such 
expectations are the unexpected. While it would be expected that a Zen Master would make 
prostrations to the Buddha upon entering the hall of worship, it is not expected of the Zen 
Master Ōbaku in light of his eccentricities. His prostrations are therefore disruptive to the 
extent that they remind the layman not to expect the unexpected if such expectations are 
dictated by reputation/convention. There are therefore three slaps in this story: the collapse 
of the expectation, the physical slap for transposing conventional understandings of cause 
and effect, and the physical slap for imbuing conventional actions with value judgments. It 
is for this reason that Zen masters are often thought to be odd in their behavior, to be 
something of tricksters and pranksters. They seem to be “poking fun” at serious social 
relationships. They use nonsense in order to dissolve the boundaries of convention, and as 
a showing of the dynamic instability and correlationality of the boundary between sense 
and nonsense itself. Such irreverence also makes manifest the ease with which its 
application can be inverted, the ease with which nonsense can make sense and vice versa. 
The foolishness of Ōbaku is thereby overcome through a sudden reversal in which the 
layman becomes the fool in light of a higher foolishness brought forth through a bow and 
a series of slaps. 
 This type of physical remonstrance is not uncommon in Zen literature. Rinzai, for 
instance, is regularly depicted striking his students as a form of direct showing. 
 
The master asked a monk, “Where do you come from?” The monk shouted. The master 
saluted him and motioned him to sit down. The monk hesitated. The master hit him. Seeing 
another monk coming, the master raised his whisk. The monk bowed low. The master hit 
him. Seeing still another monk coming, the master again raised his whisk. The monk paid 
no attention. The master hit him too. (Sasaki, 2009, p. 34) 
 
 These seemingly senseless and comic displays highlight the innate reality of 
practitioners as one of anticipation, as expecting particular responses to be correct and 
others to be false. Slapping each monk, Rinzai is able to de-situate situatedness itself, and 
thereby instruct the monks that all expectation resides within convention and is therefore 
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illusory. All expectation takes place within and according to the samsaric worldview as 
conventional reality. For the reader, these episodes begin to form a coherent pattern, and 
with it particular expectations. It is for this and similar reasons that reflexive sensitivity 
must be upheld in identifying with any of the three monks. Regardless of what is expected, 
the reader must realize that they too would be slapped. The comic value of the story can 
then be extended beyond the humorous situation of cowering monks, all of whom are to be 
struck, towards the humorous situation of the laughing reader, whose response also 
warrants a good strike. In trying to anticipate the meaning of the story, and with it the 
answer to the initial question, the sense of the story gives way to nonsense, which in turn 
makes sense anew when anticipating senselessness. 
 
The Senselessness of Transgression 
 
With a sense of senselessness as the dissolution of boundaries in light of the correlational 
ontology made possible in light of the theory of emptiness, ideas of appropriate and 
inappropriate become problematic. Transgression is both ridiculed and celebrated. It is not 
funny as a radical resistance to the force of social conventions, but instead the very idea of 
transgressing, in its newly problematized situation, is itself funny. “What place do you 
think this is—talking about coarse and fine!” we say along with Puhua. Amidst suffering, 
convention becomes a crutch with which to make sense of the overwhelming angst that 
results from it. However, the Buddhist position is that situated existence consists in nothing 
more than conventional value ascriptions according to conventional truth. Both are empty 
in and of themselves. Suffering is only suffering correlationally, from a particular vantage 
point within a particular situation. The comic spirit of Zen is able to laugh in the face of 
the suffering of situated existence. 
 In this way, Zen humor both fulfills and completely negates traditional understandings 
of laughter. Hyers writes, “Laughter may be sadistic, demented, nervous, morbid, crude, 
teasing, taunting, cynical, bitter. Humour may be a way of evading truth and avoiding 
responsibility” (1974, p. 19). Zen humor evades conventional truth and avoids the implicit 
responsibilities commanded by conventional truth. The laughter it promotes can be 
described along the lines of all the adjectives suggested by Hyers. However, by evading 
conventional truth, Zen humor points towards ultimate truth, and its laughter is only 
seemingly demented and nervous in the face of nonsense. It is only seemingly so to the 
extent that it makes no sense to impose value on senselessness. We can therefore agree 
with Hyers’ assessment that “to laugh is a sign of sanity; and the comic is deliberately used 
to break up concepts, to release tensions and to teach what cannot be taught in words. 
Nonsense is used to point to the beyond of rational sense” (1974, p. 35). To laugh a Zen 
laugh is a sign of understanding the limitations of the understanding, it is a sanity that bears 
witness to its own insanity and, it is an acknowledgement of the credibility of the incredible 
and the familiarity of the odd. 
 Zen takes itself seriously only in its ongoing folly. True liberation is made possible 
only through the dissolution of the reified, a dissolution which necessarily includes Zen 
specifically and Buddhism more generally. We are instructed to “Kill the Buddha!” should 
we come across him. Monks such as Ikkyū remind us that the scriptures make for excellent 
toilet paper. And everyone gets slapped. Everyone. Part of the motivation for this is the 
undermining of all conventions. Hyers writes, “Zen is iconoclastic in character; for before 
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true liberation can occur, all idols must be overturned, or stood upside down. Anything, 
however holy, is potentially an idol; therefore anything is a legitimate object of laughter” 
(1974, p. 103). This includes states such as prosperity, peace, and war. It also includes 
nation states, communities, individuals, and lineage. All aspects of life, insofar as they are 
true by convention within specific situations, are laughable, and are subject to the comic 
spirit. This is neither magnanimous nor petty, and remains true whether the situation 
appears perilous or stable. All things, in light of the empty and non-essential nature of 
things, are “funny.” Including urine. 
 In the hagiographic literature on Ikkyū, we find the following story recounted: 
 
Once Ikkyū was taking the Yodo no Kawase ferry on his way to Sakai. There was a 
yamabushi [ascetic hermit] on board who began to question him. 
“Hey, Your Reverence, what sect are you?” 
“I belong to the Zen sect,” replied Ikkyū. 
“I don’t suppose your sect has miracles the way our sect does?” 
“No, actually we have lots of miracles. But if it’s miracles, why don’t you show the sort of 
miracles that your people have?” 
“Well”’ said the yamabushi. “By virtue of my magic powers I can pray up Fudō before 
your very eyes and make him stand right there on the prow of the boat.” 
And, with the beads of his rosary the man began to invoke first Kongō and then Seitaka.  
At this all the passengers began to look back and forth wondering what was going to 
happen. Then, just as he had said, there on the prow of the boat, the form of Fudō appeared 
surrounded by a halo of dancing flames. 
Then, the yamabushi made a ferocious face and told them, “You’d all better offer him a 
prayer.” This made other passengers very uneasy—all, that is, but Ikkyū who was 
completely unruffled. 
“Well,” spat out the yamabushi. “How about you, Zen-monk? How are you going to deal 
with my miracle?” 
“By producing a miracle of my own. From my very body I will cause water to issue forth 
and extinguish the flames of your Fudō. You’d better start up your prayers again.” And 
Ikkyū began to pee mightily all over the flames until at last the yamabushi’s magic was 
counteracted, and the entire image melted away. 
Thereupon the passengers on the boat all bowed to Ikkyū for this wonderful display. 
(Olson, 2006, p. 367) 
 
 Despite its transgressive tone, this story is meant neither to offend nor to please. It 
must be remembered that all “transgressions” against the sacred fail to make sense in light 
of the doctrine of non-dualism. Killing the Buddha, peeing on sacred apparitions, using the 
scriptures to wipe away filth, these are all meaningful as practices of direct pointing to 
ultimate reality, to the relational interdependence of sense and value claims, and as 
exemplifications of a comic style used to dissolve illusions through the sudden collapse of 
expectations. Such humor extends the conventional beyond its sense through non-sense, 
ultimately allowing for insights into ultimate reality and the true sense of senselessness. 
They provide insights into emptiness and no-thing.  
 Occasions for this type of insight abound in all aspects of life, including the suffering 
of situated existence. Amidst suffering, take heed of the fact that it is only so from a limited 
contextual perspective borne out of convention and stick your tongue out. Note the place 
from whence you have discerned it to be so and ask yourself on what grounds it merits its 
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reified status and truth. Kick a table over, urinate, and laugh. As you laugh, do not be afraid 
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